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Offshoring, local market entry, and the strategic context of cross-border alliances:
the impact on the governance mode

Abstract
International alliances have been studied in considerable depth, but almost entirely as host
market entry options. And while much global value production is done through international
alliances, the organizational forms used to control dispersed value chains are often reduced to
“make or buy” – that is, captive operations vs. market-based outsourcing. We examine how
strategic purpose (vertical or offshore production vs. horizontal or production for local market
entry) affects the choice of cooperative governance form. We contend that an offshore
production role, as opposed to a market entry strategy, makes an alliance more likely to be
governed as a contractual alliance than as a joint venture. Data on 261 cross-border alliances in
the major appliances industry largely support our hypotheses. Further, strategic purpose
moderates the effects of alliance activities and of the institutional environment of the host
country on the choice of governance form.
_______________________________________________________________________
Keywords: Alliances, Joint Ventures, Global production networks, Governance,
Household products, Offshoring
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Offshoring, local market entry, and the strategic context of cross-border alliances:
the impact on the governance mode

1. Introduction
International alliances are defined as collaborative agreements involving multiple
business organizations located in different countries. They can be governed as simple contractual
alliances (international contractual alliances) or as shared equity alliances (international joint
ventures) in which a jointly owned entity is created (Contractor & Ra, 2002; Gulati & Singh,
1998). The choice of the appropriate transactional governance mode is a major consideration in
studies of cooperative strategies (Child, Faulkner & Tallman, 2005; Hennart, 1988;
Hutzschenreuter, Lewin, & Dresel, 2011; Madhok & Tallman, 1998). In the literature, this
choice has mainly been addressed in the context of local host market entry within a marketseeking (horizontal) strategy on the part of a multinational corporation (MNC) (Brouthers &
Hennart, 2007). The decision by an MNC to use a long-term contract as opposed to a joint
venture when the strategic purpose of the alliance is to access offshore value-adding activities
(vertical strategy) has been largely overlooked (Jahns, Hartmann, & Bals, 2006; Tallman &
Mudambi, 2013). However, the increasing use of joint production in global value chains suggests
to us that a better understanding of how strategic purpose (horizontal vs. vertical) affects
governance choices for international alliance strategies is a relevant concern to international
strategy.
The increasing importance of geographically dispersed global value production
(commonly, offshore production or just “offshoring”) for goods and services is linked to
economic, political and legal changes, socio-demographic trends, and rapid increases in
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technology development in potential host countries. In its broadest explanation, offshoring refers
to situating value-adding activities within a vertical value chain in locations outside the target
market country’s boundaries (Monczka et al., 2005). It occurs when companies disperse their
value chain activities to those locations in which they can be carried out most effectively and
efficiently, independent of the market(s) in which the products are sold, thereby creating
arbitrage opportunities for geographically dispersed value production (Mudambi, 2008). i Firms
use a variety of organizational forms to implement and control offshoring, but these often have
been reduced to the choice of ‘make or buy’; that is, captive (i.e., wholly owned) operations
versus outsourcing via market transactions to specialist suppliers. This stark contrast suggests
that only the simplest, least strategic supply agreements should be exposed to market
transactional risks – more complex or essential activities should be internalized. However, it is
clearly the case for both manufacturing and services that critical value-adding activities
frequently are outsourced to offshore suppliers (Lewin & Volberda, 2011).
We believe that the extensive use of outsourcing in global value chains is better
interpreted using Mudambi and Tallman’s (2010) argument that most outsourcing transactions
actually are structured as alliances – “allying to access” resources rather than “buying from the
external market”. They propose that when the resources that the firm is trying to access are
complex or involve tacit knowledge, international alliances are likely to improve trust and
coordination and introduce a more stable, more collaborative and lower risk transactional setting
than arms’ length markets, but at a lower cost than wholly-owned subsidiaries (Gulati & Singh,
1998; Phene & Tallman, 2012). Indeed, the growing use of international alliances in global value
chains is well documented (McDermott, Mudambi, & Parente, 2013) in diverse industries such
as electronics, aircraft manufacturing, or pharmaceuticals.
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We ask two basic research questions to illuminate the impact of strategic purpose on the
control of alliances. First, does the strategic purpose of an international alliance – that is, the use
of the alliances to produce for local host markets as opposed to generate value for non-local
(regional, global or home) markets – moderate the use of contractual vs. equity-based
governance modes? Second, does the set of activities engaged in by an alliance relate differently
to the choice of governance mode depending on this strategic purpose? To address these
questions, we incorporate the body of knowledge tied to international alliances (Dunning, 1995;
Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Pan & Tse, 1996) with that of offshoring and global value chains
(Khan, Shenkar, & Lew, 2015; Lewin & Volberda, 2011). In doing so, we contribute to the
literature on international alliances by showing how offshoring, seen as a strategic purpose of the
alliance, invites the adoption of contractual governance modes, while market-seeking is
preferably managed through joint ventures. This argument implies that global value-adding
activities are likely to be constructed of centrally directed networks of contractual alliances. We
also suggest that offshoring interacts with the type of value chain activities shared in the alliance
and with the host country institutional factors to determine the governance mode. While a
transaction cost perspective is compatible with our conclusions, we mostly base our reasoning on
the idea that equity solutions in international alliances are driven by the need for coordination in
complex transactions (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003).
To test our hypotheses, we study the effects of the strategic purposes of international
aliances in the home appliances industry, which has a long history of cross-border deals that
industry players have used both to pursue offshoring and to enter new markets. Home appliances
are globally ubiquitous, the core technologies used in different markets differ relatively little, and
cost competition is intense. International sourcing is common and has been in place for decades.
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Our findings show that indeed strategic purpose does matter, in that the use of joint ventures is
less frequent than contractual alliances for offshore-production alliances than for market entry.
We also find that the strategic purpose of the alliance moderates the effects of various activity
and location variables on the choice of alliance governance form, e.g., a manufacturing role
makes a joint venture significantly more likely in the case of an offshoring strategy, but less so
for a market entry strategy.
The next section of the paper addresses the literature of alliance governance, followed by
the development of a model of governing offshore outsourcing and the statement of various
hypotheses. This is followed by a set of empirical tests and discussion of the impact of strategic
purpose on alliance governance. We close with an appeal to consider how important the explicit
adoption of a cooperative alternative is to understanding the drivers and consequences of
governing geographically dispersed value-adding activities.

2. Background and hypotheses
2.1. The governance of international alliances
Two theoretical perspectives of the several applied to international alliances (Brouthers &
Hennart, 2007) are most relevant to our analysis. First, from a transaction cost analysis
perspective, international alliances are intermediate forms between markets and hierarchies
(Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Oxley, 1997). As levels of transaction specific investment increase
under conditions of uncertainty and small numbers, the value of more hierarchy-like forms
increases. While various models offer somewhat different mechanisms, they all reflect the
concept that the more complex, strategic, and uncertain the international alliance, the more likely
a joint venture will be put in place.
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Second, a resource-based perspective suggests that the need for coordination in more
complex transactions (Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003), rather than fears of
partner opportunism, drives the choice of equity solutions. Joint ventures are expected to allow
for a more adaptable cooperative transaction. Coordination costs in the resource-based view are
tied to the complexity of international alliance transactions that increase interdependencies
between the partners, both technological and social (White & Lui, 2005). Sharma and Erramilli
(2004) state that contractual modes are likely when the transaction is driven by easily
transmissible explicit knowledge, while joint ventures will occur when complementary resources
are tacit. The firm-like structure of joint ventures facilitates joint activities, enables tacit
knowledge sharing, and supports the development of relationships among partners to the joint
venture (Liu, Adair, & Bello, 2015; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Oxley & Wada, 2010; Tallman &
Shenkar, 1994). Oxley and Sampson (2004) show that a broader scope of knowledge and
activities, such as the combination of manufacturing and R&D capabilities, makes the use of
equity forms of governance more likely in international alliances.
Overall, both perspectives suggest that more complex transactions involving greater
interdependencies between partners with more reliance on tacit knowledge will make the
hierarchy-like governance structures of joint ventures more likely (Gulati & Singh, 1998).
Superior coordination of resources and capabilities in joint ventures will offset greater
transaction specific investment, while giving both partners reason to avoid opportunistic actions
(Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Phene & Tallman, 2012). However, international alliances can be
established for different purposes, in particular to govern offshore outsourcing rather than enter
foreign markets, raising the question of how these purposes impact on factors that drive
governance mode decisions. We address this question in the next sections.
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2.2. Market-seeking vs. offshoring as strategic purposes of international alliances
We focus on whether a horizontal strategy to better access the local host market leads to
different tendencies in governance of an international alliance than does vertical offshoring in the
global value chain. The alternative governance choices considered are non-equity contractual
alliances versus equity-based joint ventures, since the decision to use or not use equity
participation is the predominant focus of studies of international alliance governance (Globerman
& Nielsen, 2007; Hennart, 1988; Pan & Tse, 2000).
The original models of foreign direct investment in value-adding activities focused on
market-seeking strategies (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Local host country activities were
assumed to be substitutes for trade and licensing into the host market (Dunning, 1988).
International alliances were largely seen as second-best alternatives to wholly-owned
subsidiaries when foreign markets limited equity participation (Tallman & Shenkar, 1994).
International alliances, as with other entry modes, were treated as horizontal investments to
govern the introduction of resources or products developed in one market into another (Brouthers
& Hennart, 2007). Particularly in mature industries, local partners could provide strategic skills
for the local market, with the MNC providing technology and branding (Contractor & Lorange,
1988). However, international alliances to service the host market customer base may require
many interacting strategic decisions by the local management and high levels of coordination
between partners. So, a resource-based perspective suggests that a joint venture, as a separate
entity with a degree of managerial independence, is more effective in governing market-seeking
alliances than a contractual venture without its own dedicated management.
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Offshored activities, as parts of a globally dispersed value chain, are more likely to be
narrowly defined with clearly specified objectives and coordinated with other value-adding
activities in other locations by a global or regional headquarter. At the same time, modern
communication and contracting technology has made communication of resources much more
effective (Asmussen, Larsen & Pedersen, 2016; McDermott et al., 2013). This makes for fairly
straightforward and lower cost inter-firm transactions, reducing the benefit of internalization.
From a resource-based perspective, offshoring may well be controlled by contractual
arrangements, particularly in mature industries with well-understood products and demand
characteristics. According to transaction cost models, threats of opportunism may still exist, in
that a contractor must have some access to the underlying technology to generate component
goods or services; moreover, failure to deliver can hurt the entire value chain. However, in
industries where technologies are established and reputations are widely shared, opportunism by
suppliers can be limited by contracting, parent firm experience, use of multiple suppliers,
partner-specific relational investing, modular production techniques, and reputational effects
enhanced by modern information technology. All these factors suggest that contracts can offer
sufficient protection and oversight to maintain global value chains. Indeed, joint ventures may
offer local equity-holding partners more opportunity to interfere with strategic decision-making
or to divert production to local markets, and they offer more opportunities for unintended
exposure of related technology and managerial methods than do contractual alliances. This leads
us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The use of joint ventures versus contractual alliances is less likely when
the primary strategic purpose of an international alliance is offshore production of value for
international markets as compared to local market entry.
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2.3. The role of activity content in shaping the governance mode of international alliances
Individual firms vary greatly in selecting which of their activities can best be offshored
(Jensen & Pedersen, 2011). Firms are generally expected to maintain the tightest control over
core activities and outsource less critical tasks to more efficient specialists (McDermott et al.,
2013). A resource-based perspective suggests that more complex activities requiring more
interdependency among partners are more likely to be governed as a joint venture (Rugman &
Verbeke, 2003). In the foreign direct investment literature, with its focus on market-seeking
investment, international alliances result from intermediate levels of market inefficiency.
Hennart (1988) writes that joint ventures result when both sides are providing complex tacit
knowledge for which markets fail. A resource-based approach would say that integrating
complex tacit knowledge requires the flexibility and relationships that are built in joint ventures,
while transmitting explicit knowledge can be managed effectively through contracts (Phene &
Tallman, 2012). For offshore production, modular design principles suggest that the interfaces
between modules must be clearly specified, while the processes within the module can be given
local autonomy, so long as the outputs are to specification for the next module (McDermott et
al., 2013). Thus, the strategic purpose may be seen as moderating the effect of different task
responsibilities on the international alliance governance decision. We look in particular at three
value-chain activities – manufacturing, marketing, and R&D – that constitute identifiable
functions within an alliance that are considered highly characteristic of its contents (Oxley &
Sampson, 2004). In our reasoning, we focus on how each activity interacts with the strategic
purpose of the alliance to determine different degrees of transactional complexity.
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Manufacturing. In the previous literature, authors worked on the core hypothesis that the
stage in the product life cycle, the product content (e.g. technology intensity), the need to
respond to local needs and the value-to-weight ratio determine a certain manufacturing strategy
and, in particular, the choice of a foreign location (DuBois, Toyne, & Oliff, 1993). Contractor
and Kundu (1998) argue that when the proprietary content of products is high the international
alliance form will tend towards joint ventures. Rugman and Verbeke (2003) show that joint
ventures are particularly relevant to complex activities such as manufacturing. In the case of
production for local markets, though, licensing by the MNC to a local manufacturer that is then
allowed to manage other local market duties independently is a well established alternative
(Dunning, 1988). In Brouthers and Hennart’s (2007) terms, the local partner’s inputs may be
tacit and complex, but the MNC’s technology can be specified. So, a license for local production
is feasible, especially for mature products. For example, the MNC needs only provide design
specifications to local producers for the traditional production of metal appliances.
In the case of offshoring, though, the transactional complexity of a dispersed production
network, the necessity to meet different local expectations for product characteristics, the
existence of international standards for quality and performance, and the importance of quick
response to global needs determine greater coordination needs for manufacturing activities.
These needs favor relational linkages. The activities of the local partner must be constrained to
its part in the manufacturing network, and the MNC has to provide the tacit and complex inputs
for which market-like transactions typically fail (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Equity ownership
offers a degree of hierarchical control over alliance processes, and we suggest:
Hypothesis 2a. When an international alliance includes manufacturing activities, the use
of joint ventures is more likely than that of contractual alliancess if the primary strategy of the
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international alliance is offshore production of value for international markets as compared to
local market entry.

Marketing. This is also a complex activity requiring knowledge of both the product and
the preferences of consumers, especially for market-seeking horizontal investments that are
established as international alliances. In these alliances, the product and technological
capabilities of the MNC need to be augmented by a deep understanding of local demand that is
often tied to cultural preferences, local market characteristics, and geographical issues that can
affect production (Asmussen et al., 2016). Strategies dependent on local marketing efforts seem
likely to require close coordination of different capabilities, adaptability to demand variations on
the part of the local partner, and strong needs for MNC partners to protect brand identities. Such
high levels of interdependence suggest the need for more partner accommodation (Bello,
Katsikeas, & Robson, 2010), a condition more feasible in joint ventures.
In the case of marketing alliances with a broader geographical scope, evidence is mixed
(Li, Boulding, & Staelin, 2010), with less internationally experienced firms tending to use joint
ventures and more experienced firms tending toward non-equity forms. Marketing activities such
as global advertising campaigns are often outsourced to multinational advertising firms via longterm contracts. International firms also typically have affiliates in many markets to conduct
activities such as media buying, while distribution may be outsourced for efficiency to local
distributors that carry many products, all specifiable activities.
Overall, we see the transactional complexity in this case to be greater for marketing in a
local market than for geographically broad marketing efforts. We anticipate that entry strategies
with marketing goals will tend toward equity ties with local partners both to ease concerns for
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brand corruption and to ensure coordination in the local market, while globally directed
marketing will be more likely to use contractual arrangements. So, we predict:
Hypothesis 2b. When an international alliance includes marketing activities, the use of
joint ventures is less likely than that of contractual alliances if the primary strategy of the
international alliance is offshore production of value for international markets as compared to
local market entry.

R&D. The offshoring of R&D is a growing phenomenon. MNCs locate R&D activities
abroad to benefit from unique capabilities available in foreign countries (Maskell, Pedersen,
Petersen, & Dick-Nielsen, 2007), to adapt to local requirements (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005),
and to be close to production facilities (Sanna-Randaccio & Veugelers, 2007). Foreign R&D has
traditionally been seen as primarily local development-focused, providing host market
adaptations for technologies imported by MNCs from home and produced locally – what
Kuemmerle (1997) describes as competence augmenting innovation. R&D-related factors that
widely influence the governance mode include the extent of inter-partner interaction, the
complexity of the task undertaken by the alliance, types of partners, and scope of R&D activities
(Choi & Contractor, 2016; Li & Xie, 2016). While most often associated with wholly-owned
subsidiaries due to the need to protect both technical and brand identity (Gubbi & Elango, 2016),
the same concerns suggest that product development for local markets, when handled by an
international alliance, is more likely to be carried out via a joint venture.
From an offshoring perspective, R&D activities located in a foreign country are used to
create knowledge for application to global production. Innovation is the primary driving force
behind competence-creating subsidiaries, sourcing local knowledge flows associated with higher
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‘upstream’ R&D expenditures (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2011). However, as Sanna-Randaccio and
Veugelers (2007) affirm, R&D offshoring intensifies the spillover of valuable know-how to
competitors located in the foreign markets. Nieto and Rodriguez (2011) suggest that when R&D
is less closely tied to manufacturing for the local market, for instance in the case of
pharmaceutical trials in India for drugs intended for Western industrial markets (Haakonsson,
Jensen, & Mudambi, 2013), the openness required in joint ventures discourages their use. Rather,
R&D activities are assigned to host-country contractors with specifically limited access to the
parent company’s technology. Overall, we conclude that the use of joint ventures in international
alliances that include R&D will be less common when their strategic purpose is offshoring rather
than for market seeking, and hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2c. When an international alliance includes R&D activities, the use of joint
ventures is less likely than the use of contractual alliances if the main purpose of the international
alliance is offshore production of value for international markets as compared to local market
entry

2.4. The impact of location in determining the governance mode of international alliances
Country characteristics also affect the governance mode of international alliances. Phene
and Tallman (2012) refer to “contextual uncertainty” when the administrative and socioeconomic features of the host country are very different from the country of origins. Differences
in protection of intangible assets, degree of corruption, legal framework, economic development,
and informal institutions create an uncertainty than firms need to mitigate (Haakonsson et al.,
2013; Sartor & Beamish, 2014). The location assumes a particular significance if characterized
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by instability of regulatory obligations or intellectual property regimes. Many emerging markets
in particular are still characterized by “institutional voids” (Khanna & Palepu, 2011).
The level of a country’s governance infrastructure is shown to be inversely correlated
with the need to create equity controls in alliances (Globerman & Nielsen, 2007; Pan et al.,
2014). The higher the contextual uncertainty created by weak local public institutions, the more
uncertain the ability to enforce contracts and the more likely is ownership involvement by the
MNC. This argument suggests that joint ventures can substitute for weak institutions (Hennart,
1988). For this reason, it is possible to infer that countries with strong institutions will constitute
a better environment for contractual alliances to prosper, while in countries with weaker
institutions, joint ventures should be more common. However, we expect the effect to be
stronger for alliances engaged in offshore production, since MNCs must coordinate the local
activities in one place with other value-adding activities in other locations. Moreover, contract
violations in a global supply chain can have company-wide consequences; therefore, MNCs will
be more in need of enforceable contracts and institutional stability. In contrast, when the
international alliance is intended to serve the host market, the damages coming from violations
of contracts and partner opportunism are more likely to remain confined at the local level. So, we
predict:
Hypothesis 3. The negative correlation between a stronger host country institutional
environment and the use of joint ventures will be greater when the purpose of the international
alliance is offshore production of value for international markets as compared to local market
entry
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3. Methodology
3.1. Sample and Data
The sample consists of international alliances in the home appliances industry (SIC code
363) between 1986 and 2012. We chose this industry for three reasons. First, it is a truly global
industry with important producers and large markets in all major economic regions. Second, this
industry has undergone significant restructuring and dynamism during the past thirty years
(Bonaglia, Goldstein, & Mathews, 2007): numerous mergers and acquisitions took place, with
the objectives being consolidation and international expansion. Finally, offshoring is intense
among major appliance manufacturers, because competition is based on cost efficiencies and the
use of remote locations for performing supply chain activities at lower cost.
The data source was SDC Platinum, a comprehensive set of databases maintained by
Thomson Reuters Financial Securities Data (Schilling, 2009). The logic was to include all the
international alliances in which at least one of the participants operated in the home appliance
industry (as defined through its SIC code) and the declared purpose of the deal included
manufacturing, marketing, or R&D activities directly related to home appliances. The initial list
consisted of 386 deals; we had to drop 74 of them because they lacked information that we
needed to code our variables, and in particular our OFFSHORE dummy, e.g. the strategic
objectives and the activities of the deal were not detailed enough to establish whether it was
mainly intended to serve the local market or to offshore value chain activities. We then removed
51 domestic deals (i.e., all the participants were from the same country, which was also the
location of the alliance), leaving us with 261 cross-border deals based in 46 different countries.
Table 1 lists the locations of the deals and the home countries of the participating firms. Figure 1
shows the distribution of years; the histogram reveals peak years in 1994 and 1995.
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--------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
----------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
---------------------------------

3.2. Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the governance mode adopted by the partners for a particular
international alliance. When SDC Platinum did not detail the governance mode we traced the
original press news and other company information at the time of the announcement. In coding
this variable, we looked at the original governance mode at the date of announcement, ignoring
possible subsequent mode dynamics (Pedersen, Petersen, & Benito, 2002). We have three
governance modes: joint ventures, strategic alliances that did not involve equity injections of any
kind, and strategic alliances with minority investments of at least one of the partners in the equity
of the other. Observations are respectively 200, 54, and 7 for the three cases. We choose to group
minority investments with contractual alliances, because in general minority stakes do not entail
the degree of risk and the level of coordination between partners that are typical of joint
ventures. Therefore, our dependent variable is JV, which takes the value 1 when the deal is a
joint venture (excluding minority equity investments), and 0 otherwise. However, as a robustness
check, we also coded an EQUITY dummy, which takes the value 1 when the deal is a joint
venture or a minority equity investment, and 0 otherwise.

3.3. Independent variables
To test the effects of the offshoring vs. market-seeking strategic orientations we built a
dummy variable, OFFSHORE, that takes the value 1 if the international alliance was not mainly
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intended to serve the local market and 0 otherwise. We defined the local market as the country
where the international alliance was located. The guiding criterion was that market-seeking uses
production and distribution to serve local markets, while offshoring is driven by resourceseeking, efficiency-seeking, or knowledge-seeking goals to produce for international markets.
Ideally, market-seeking could be operationalized through the local sales of the venture (Nachum
& Zaheer, 2005), but such data were not available for our sample. For most deals the dominant
focus was already clear in the deal description in the SDC database. For other deals, we coded
this variable on the basis of information taken from press releases and company materials. When
different markets were reported in the description of the international alliance, we coded the
observation as 0 if the local market was quantitatively dominant (e.g., it represented the expected
majority of sales) or was mentioned as the primary purpose of the deal. We did not treat these
mixed cases as a distinct category because it was usually impossible to exclude that a share of
the appliances was exported (in case of market-seeking deals) or sold in the local market (in case
of offshoring). All the observations were first coded by a research assistant and then
independently by one of the authors, achieving a 86.2% inter-coder agreement rate, which is
deemed reliable (Neuendorf, 2002). Dubious cases were solved after collecting further
information; the remaining uncertain observations were abandoned.
To evaluate the effects of the activities managed by the international alliance, we built
three dummy variables, related to Hypotheses 2a–c: MANUFACTURING, MARKETING, and
R&D. Each of them takes the value 1 if the international alliance managed activities of the
relevant type and 0 otherwise. The MANUFACTURING dummy covers assembly of products,
production of components and manufacturing services; the MARKETING dummy covers
distribution, selling, and promotion; the R&D dummy covers basic and applied research and
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product development. Since many parallel activities may be the object of the venture, these
dummies are not mutually exclusive, which allowed us to include all these dummies in the same
regression without identifying a baseline case. Again, we traced the original press coverage and
companies’ information to fill holes or solve discrepancies in the SDC database, dropping the
observations in which it was impossible to determine the activities of the international alliance.
To test the effects of the location institutional environment, we used the World Bank’s
Governance Indicators. The indicators are six: control of corruption, government effectiveness,
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and
accountability. These indicators are based on variables obtained from 31 different data sources
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). The indicators are available starting from 1996; for the
preceding years (our sample starts with 1986) we used the first available value in the series. The
variance shared by the six indicators is large, with pairwise correlations ranging from 0.54 to
0.94 in our sample. Therefore, we averaged the indicators, obtaining our WGIMEAN variable,
which we use as a composite and comprehensive measure of institutional quality of the location
countries.

3.4. Control variables
We used a number of control variables. First, we included product dummies, because
different household appliances may involve different levels of transaction-specific assets, tacit
knowledge, and technological and organizational complexity. We coded three dummies:
SMALL_EL (small electrical appliances, which usually have low technological complexity);
NON_HH (non-household appliances, e.g. those used in restaurants, which are sold through
different distribution channels than home appliances); LARGE_EL (large electrical appliances,
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which usually have higher technological complexity). The baseline case consists in non-electrical
appliances, such as ovens, cooktops, and ranges.
We controlled for the previous experience of partners, since learning helps firms
overcome behavioral uncertainty (Tong & Li, 2013). To capture this dimension, we computed
EXPERIENCE, which counts how many deals (irrespective of the governance mode) partners
entered in the five years before the focal deal. We also controlled for geographic distance
Malhotra & Gaur, 2014) by calculating the average of “great circle distances” (Bouquet &
Birkinshaw, 2008) between the capital city of the location country of the international alliance
and the capital cities of the home countries of the participants in the deal (DISTANCE). We
added a MULTILATERAL dummy that takes the value 1 if more than two partners are engaged
in the venture and 0 otherwise, because multilaterality has been shown to increase the probability
of joint ventures (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). The GDP of the location country was used as a
measure of the local market size, which can influence the mode of entry.
Unfortunately, we were not able to collect financial information for most firms, for a mix
of reasons: financial statements for the 80s’ or the 90s’ were not available; a number of firms
were located in countries where financial information was scarce in general (e.g. East Germany
or USSR); others were conglomerates (such as Samsung or Matsushita) that did not consistently
report segmental financial information for household appliances. Therefore, to control for firm
size (Roza, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2011) we manually compiled a list of large players in
the industry, basing on their having established brands (internationally or in significant world
regions, such as China or Latin America), multinational presence, multiple product categories,
and being listed in stock exchanges. When compiling the list, we kept track of mergers and
acquisitions involving the firms in the sample, so that all of them were independent at the time of
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the deal (while they are not necessarily so now). An industry expert assisted us in compiling the
list, which we report in Table 2. We created two dummies: LARGE_SMALL, which takes the
value 1 when at least one of the partners is a large player and at least one is not, and 0 otherwise;
and ALL_LARGE, which takes the value 1 when all the partners are large players, and 0
otherwise. The former dummy individuates asymmetric resource endowments, while the latter
indicates bargaining symmetry and general availability of resources. 134 deals were
LARGE_SMALL, 39 were ALL_LARGE, and there was no large player in the remaining 88,
which provide the baseline case.
--------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
--------------------------------We included full year effects in the first set of models, testing Hypothesis 1. In the second
set of models, in which we split the sample to test the remaining hypotheses, reduced sample size
made it impractical to use full year effects, due to excessive loss of degrees of freedom.
Therefore in these models we used a time dummy, AFTER_1996, which takes the value 1 if the
deal was announced after 1996 (the mid-point in terms of number of deals), and 0 otherwise.
This dummy also allows to control for peak years (1994 and 1995) in the distribution of deals.
Finally, we controlled for location fixed effects, to cover unmeasured country
heterogeneity. For example, China is known for favoring joint ventures for international alliances
established in its territory. Again, to minimize loss of degree of freedoms, we considered only
the ten most numerous locations, which account for 70.1 percent of the observations, leaving the
other locations as the baseline case. We provide more details about all variable definitions and
measurement in Table 3.
--------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
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--------------------------------3.5. Model
To test our Hypothesis 1, we estimated the probability of observing a joint venture as the
governance mode of an international alliance by a logit model, which is commonly used in entry
mode research (Hennart, 1997). The model is:
Pi = 1/[1+exp(-zi)]
Pi is the probability that an observation i is a joint venture; zi is given by this formula:
zi = b0 + b1OFFSHOREi + b2MANUFACTURINGi + b3MARKETINGi + b4R&Di +
b5WGIMEANi + βZi
where β is a vector of parameters and Zi is a vector of control variables that include
MULTILATERAL, LARGE_SMALL, ALL_LARGE, GDP, SMALL_EL, NON_HH,
LARGE_EL, and year and location dummies.
To test our Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, and 3, we divided the observations in two sub-samples
defined by the OFFSHORE dummy. We then run our main specification on the sub-samples by
excluding the OFFSHORE dummy; we also replaced year effects with the AFTER_1996
dummy, to avoid excessive loss of degrees of freedom, as explained above. This sub-sample
procedure amounts to treating the OFFSHORE dummy as a moderator of the effects of the
model variables on the governance mode, avoiding well-known problems with interaction terms
in logistic models (Ai & Norton, 2003). Following Hoetker (2007), we tested for differences in
unobserved variation between the two groups; neither the likelihood-ratio test (χ2 = 0.08, p =
0.77) or the Wald χ2 test (χ2 = 0.10, p = 0.75) suggested concerns with these sub-samples to test
moderation.
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4. Results
4.1. Descriptives
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables, as well as bivariate
correlations. All correlations between all the predictor variables are smaller than |0.40|, except
for the correlation between two product dummies (0.62). We then examined the variance
inflation factors (VIF) of all the models that we present, finding that the largest VIF value is
7.60, comfortably below the recommended threshold of 10 (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990).
Therefore we concluded that there are no relevant issues of multicollinearity with our data.
--------------------------------Insert Table 4 about here
---------------------------------

4.2. Main specification
A first group of models, reported in Table 5, tests Hypothesis 1. The dependent variable
is JV. We present the results using both coefficients and odds ratios. A positive coefficient
indicates an increase in the probability of observing a joint venture; vice versa for negative
coefficients. The odds ratio is the change in the odds of the joint-venture governance mode when
the value of a predictor increases by one unit. Any odds ratio below 1 is negative, because it
implies that an increase in the predictor reduces the odds of the joint-venture mode; odds ratios
above 1 are positive and indicate increases in the odds of the mode.
Model 1 includes only control variables. In Model 2, we add the dummies that specify the
activities involved and WGIMEAN, which expresses the institutional quality of the host
countries. In Model 3 we include our variable of interest, OFFSHORE, finding that when the
purpose of the international alliance is offshoring, the coefficient is significantly negative (b = -
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1.784, p < 0.01) and the odds ratio is lower than 1 (OR = 0.168, p < 0.01). This means that the
odds of equity-based governance are 83.2 percent (1- 0.168) lower in offshoring international
alliances than they are in local market-seeking ones. These results support Hypothesis 1, which
predicted that offshoring made the joint-venture mode less likely. The percentage of correctly
classified observations for this model is 88.9 percent, which exceeds the chance rate (64.2%) by
24.7 percentage points.
--------------------------------Insert Table 5 about here
--------------------------------Notably, the odds ratio of MANUFACTURING is greater than 1 and statistically
significant in Models 2 (p < 0.001) and 3 (p < 0.001). This is confirmed by descriptives: 82.3
percent of the international alliances that include manufacturing activities are joint ventures,
against 45.5 percent of the international alliances that do not include these activities.
MARKETING is not statistically significant. The odds ratio of R&D is smaller than 1 and
marginally significant (OR = 0.177, p < 0.10), indicating that international alliances with R&D
activities are less likely to be joint ventures than those that do not include them.

4.3. Sub-sample analysis
Table 6 reports the models that test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c and 3. Again, we present
coefficients and odds ratios. JV is the dependent variable. We divided the observations into two
sub-samples defined by the OFFSHORE dummy. The first group includes the observations in
which the value of the dummy is 0 (model 4, “market-seeking”, N = 96), the second those in
which it is 1 (model 5, “offshoring”, N = 165). A Chow test (DeMaris, 2004) was used to check
whether the difference between the coefficients of the two models was statistically significant.
The test revealed that it is (χ2 (17) = 34.052, p < 0.01). For MANUFACTURING, we found that
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the significance of coefficients and odds ratios increase in the offshoring subsample (p < 0.01
level), compared to the market-seeking one (p < 0.05), providing support to our Hypothesis 2a.
For MARKETING, we failed to find evidence of a meaningful difference between the two
subsamples; therefore, Hypothesis 2b seems not to be supported. For R&D, we observe an
improvement in statistical significance of the negative coefficient (odds ratio lower than 1) when
moving from the market-seeking group (p > 0.10) to the offshoring one (p < 0.10); this result
only weakly supports Hypothesis 2c. For WGIMEAN, the results are that the coefficient and the
odds ratio are statistically significant only in the offshoring subsample (p < .01), indicating a
negative impact on the dependent variable, and providing support to Hypothesis 3.
--------------------------------Insert Table 6 about here
--------------------------------To facilitate interpretation of the moderation role of the strategic purpose of the
international alliance, we plotted the predicted probability of the dependent variable against our
variables of interest (Figure 2). As the figure shows, the moderation effect is stronger for
MANUFACTURING (which is associated with a lower probability of a joint venture in the
market-seeking group, but not in the offshoring one) and R&D (which is associated with lower
probability of a joint venture only in the offshoring group), and weaker, but still noticeable, for
MARKETING and WGIMEAN.
--------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
--------------------------------4.4. Further analyses
Table 7 presents robustness checks and post-estimation analyses. Model 6 is similar to
our main specification, which we used to test Hypothesis 1, but it has EQUITY (including both
joint ventures and minority investments) as the dependent variable. Again, this model supports
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Hypothesis 1; the coefficient of OFFSHORE is negative and the odds ratio is lower than 1 (p <
0.05). In the third column, we added marginal effects (ME), which are a measure of the
magnitude of the relationship (Wieserma & Bowen, 2009). MEs show the impact of the predictor
in terms of change in probability of the dependent variable.We computed MEs of predictors as
the averages of the single MEs at each observation. We calculated that, when the value of
OFFSHORE is 0, the average probability of equity-based governance is 85.9 percent; the
probability drops to 75.1 percent when the value of OFFSHORE is 1 (ME = -0.108, p < 0.01). As
a comparison, in the subsequent column we report MEs for our previous Model 3 (in which JV is
the dependent variable): the ME of OFFSHORE is -0.144 (p < 0.01), implying that the average
probability of observing a joint venture decreases from 85.4 percent when the value of
OFFSHORE is 0 to 71.0 percent when the value of OFFSHORE is 1.
Models 7 and 8 are similar to previous models 4 and 5 (which we used to test Hypotheses
2a, 2b, 2c, and 3) but again they have EQUITY as a dependent variable. We report only
coefficients, for brevity. The Chow test shows that the difference of the coefficients between the
two models is statistically significant: χ2 (17) = 47.077, p < 0.01. The results confirm that the
coefficient of MANUFACTURING is more significant in the offshoring group (p < 0.01) than it
is in the market-seeking group (p < 0.10), adding support to Hypothesis 2a. The coefficients of
MARKETING and R&D are not significant in the offshoring group, indicating limited
robustness for Hypotheses 2b and 2c. As in previous results, the coefficient of WGIMEAN is
significant only in the offshoring group (p < .01), providing further support to Hypothesis 3.
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5. Discussion and conclusions
5.1. Theoretical implications
The purpose of the study was to compare the factors that drive the governance structure
of international alliances associated with market-seeking strategies to those engaged in
offshoring strategies. The guiding idea was that the likelihood of using equity-based modes as
opposed to contractual modes is different in the case of offshoring as opposed to the well-studied
market-access strategy. We theorized that, as a strategic purpose, offshoring makes an
international alliance less likely to be governed as a joint venture than in the case of a market
entry alliance. Further, strategic purpose moderates the effects on the governance mode choice of
the shared activities of the international alliance and the quality of the institutional environment
of the host country. Our study tried to extend the understanding of how the strategic rationale of
participating firms influences decisions about how to organize an international alliance; previous
literature has mostly looked at international alliances as modes of market entry (Gomes, Barnes,
& Mahmood, 2016), while research on their role in building global offshored value chains is
comparitevely underdeveloped.
We used the household appliance industry to test the hypotheses, using logistic regression
and comparing sub-samples of market-seeking and offshoring international alliances to
determine if the weights of the different activities and levels of local institutional quality vary
across strategic purposes. Our hypothesized relationships were largely upheld. What, then, is the
meaning of these findings? We suggested at the beginning of this paper that more complex
transactions should be more likely governed through equity participation, whether to reduce
transactional risks and costs or to improve coordination of complex activities. We found that the
odds of using a joint venture rather than a contractual alliance were 83.2% lower for offshoring
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production oriented international alliances. This suggests that as complex as global value chains
might be, the individual transactions that comprise them are amenable to specified contracts.
This fits with the principles of modular production in the global value chains (McDermott et al.,
2013) in which the complexity of the system is managed by the corporate headquarters and
individual units are given fairly specific technical objectives. At the same time, it appears that an
alliance with responsibility for an ever changing and competitive local market is more likely to
play a real strategic role locally, a role enhanced by the separate organization created through a
joint venture.
We believe that these results, and the finding that alliances which incorporate
manufacturing tend to be governed as joint ventures, also provide insight on the relative value of
transaction cost theory and resource-based theory in explaining alliance governance in different
strategic circumstances. The weak results for R&D and local institutional controls, the standard
core technologies in this mature industry, and that the same firms and countries are involved in
both strategies, implies that transaction costs should not be systematically higher for either
strategy. Thus, the greater use of the strategically flexible joint ventures for locally focused
market entry suggests that coordination needs tend to dominate under this strategy (Phene &
Tallman, 2012). Likewise, the focus on multiple contracts to oversee an offshore production
strategy indicates that coordination needs tend to be lower. In this, complex coordination is
managed at the global headquarter level, allowing for relatively simple individual transactions
with efficient governance through contracts.
Finally, our findings enrich the offshoring literature, which has not frequently focused on
cooperative forms of transaction governance and has largely ignored the question of choosing
between equity and non-equity forms to manage outsourced offshore production. MNCs may use
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a variety of organizational forms to implement and control offshore value-adding activities,
spanning everything from wholly owned operations to market-based transactions with suppliers.
Most outsourced offshore production activities actually involve repeated, complex contractual
engagements or shared equity involvement, which differ from market-entry alliances in terms of
optimal degree of control, or commitment of resources, and require further investigation.

5.2 Managerial implications
The governance mode of international alliances is a primary driver of their performance.
The operational and financial results from international alliances are often frustrating, which
emphasizes the need for robust theoretical frameworks that provide a reference for decision
making. In a managerial perspective, our most notable finding is that the drivers of governance
choice between contractual alliances and joint ventures are considerably different when the
strategic purpose of the international alliance is market entry than when it is offshoring. Strategic
purpose not only affects the choice of governance structure, but also moderates the effects of
several other tested and control variables on the choice between contractual and equity-based
alliance form.
Our results suggest that international alliances are indeed an appropriate, flexible way to
implement offshoring in global networks. This shows that the choice of equity or contract-based
alliance is an alternative that companies should better scrutinize when deciding the route to
implement the delocalization of their value chain activities, beyond the typical alternatives of
captive offshoring and offshore arms’-length outsourcing. The data presented in this study about
major appliance strategic alliances give some substantial insights on the drivers of the
governance choice when the objective is to delocalize the activities along a global value chain.
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Our results further suggest that patterns of influences on governance decisions for traditional
market-entry international alliances are not completely relevant to the choice of alliance
governance in the case of offshore value production. Managers need to be aware that vertical
alliances may be exposed to relatively low transactional complexity, at least in mature industries,
which makes equity forms redundant to control offshored activities.

5.3. Limitations and directions for future research
It is worthwhile to underline that some research limitations may exist. The first limitation
is that a single industry, major appliances, was chosen to perform the empirical analysis. As a
traditional manufacturing industry that uses but has not been transformed by information
technology, home appliances seems to be fairly representative of a number of established
industrial sectors that are transitioning to globally networked value chains. However, specifics of
industry size, geographical dispersion or the types of players can be characterizing factors,
whose changes in another industry could modify the outcome of the investigation. The time
horizon could be a limitation, too: our database of major appliance alliances covers a mediumlength term of 25 years. Results could be different if looking back further in time, for example by
considering the early history of the modern major appliance industry since it shift to mass
production after WWII, or if focusing the attention only on its most recent history, namely the
last decade, when dispersed production has become more common. Linked to the latter, a
drawback for the empirical investigation may arise from the source of data. SDC Platinum is a
research database developed from professional sources, both publicly available and private. Its
accuracy is guaranteed from the Nineties onward; therefore, the represented alliances before that
date can be only partial. Furthermore, even if its sources are extensive, this does not ensures the
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total inclusion of the strategic alliances. Finally, our dataset was relatively small and did not
allow us to explore further issues related to the choice of governance modes, such the use of
different modes in different value chains activities across host markets by the same firm (Benito,
Petersen, & Welch, 2009).
Our findings suggest that the phenomenon of offshoring through contractual alliances
requires further study — the “rules” developed from earlier studies of market entry international
alliances cannot be assumed to be relevant in this new context. We also supported the value of
modular strategies in the offshoring production case. It would be interesting to perform a finer
distinction in the governance types of strategic alliances, beyond equity versus non-equity, in
order to study their drivers in the offshoring context. Furthermore, the links between
collaborative agreements and other modalities to manage internationally dispersed value chain
activities could be explored, since cooperation may be the first step in preparing for other moves
in the form of mergers and acquisitions or greenfield investments. We believe that further
investigation of the role of cooperative agreements in governing offshore outsourcing
arrangements is essential to understanding the dynamics of dispersed value chains.
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Table 1
Distribution of the sample across locations and home countries. Location is defined as the country that
hosts the deal. Home countries are counted as the sum of the occurrences of partners from focal countries
in the deals in the sample.
Country
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Belarus
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
China
Colombia
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
East Germany
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan

Home
Location countries Country

2

5
2
1
83
1
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
22
7
1
1
3
15
1
4

1
1
7
1
1
5
2
5
104
1
4
1
2
2
2
7
16
4
12
4
23
7
1
2
23
83
1
5

Kyrgyzstan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Poland
Republic of Ireland
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Slovak Republic
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Total

Home
Location countries
1
7
3
1
2
1
1
1
2
3
4
1
3
14
1
1
1
6
6
5
3
5
14
4
9
261

11
3
5
2
1
1
1
2
3
5
4
3
2
3
38
3
23
3
8
4
10
1
2
17
70
5
9
566
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Table 2.
List of large players. Firms when included in list based on their having established brands (globally or in
significant regions), multinational presence, multiple product categories and being listed in stock
exchanges over the period.
Arcelik
Bosch Siemens
Candy
Daewoo
Daikin
Electrolux
Fagor

GE
Godrej
Gorenje
Haier
Hisense Kelon
Hitachi
LG

Mabe
Matsushita
Maytag
Merloni
Midea
Miele
Mitsubishi

Philips
Samsung
Sanyo
Sharp
Thomson
Toshiba
Vestel

Videocon
Whirlpool
Wuxi

Table 3
Variable definitions.
Variable

Definition

JV

It takes the value 1 when the international alliance is a joint venture, and 0
otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum.
EQUITY
It takes the value 1 when the international alliance is a joint venture or a
minority investment, and 0 otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum.
OFFSHORE
It takes the value 1 when the international alliance is not mainly intended to
serve the local market, and 0 otherwise. Source: manually coded, based on SDC
Platinum, press releases, and company materials.
MANUFACTURING It takes the value 1 when the international alliance manages activities related to
assembly of products, production of components, and manufacturing services,
and 0 otherwise. Source: manually coded, based on SDC Platinum, press
releases, and company materials.
MARKETING
It takes the value 1 when the international alliance manages activities related to
distribution, selling, and promotion, and 0 otherwise. Sources: manually coded,
based on SDC Platinum, press releases, and company materials.
R&D
It takes the value 1 when the international alliance manages activities related to
basic and applied research and product development, and 0 otherwise. Sources:
manually coded, based on SDC Platinum, press releases, and company
materials.
WGIMEAN
Aggregate indicator of quality of institutions in the host country of the
international alliances. It consists in the mean of the six World Bank’s
Governance indicators: control of corruption (degree to which public power is
used for private gain or controlled by private interests), government
effectiveness (quality of the public service, independence from the political
process, government’s commitment to implementation of policies), political
stability and absence of violence/terrorism (the probability that a government is
overthrown illegally or by violence), regulatory quality (soundness of policies
for regulating and developing the private sector), rule of law (the extent to
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EXPERIENCE

DISTANCE

MULTILATERAL

LARGE_SMALL

ALL_LARGE

GDP
SMALL_EL

NON_HH

LARGE_EL

AFTER_1996

which people are confident in and respect the laws), voice and accountability
(freedom of people to participate in government selection, including freedom of
speech, press, and association). Each indicator ranges from − 2.5 to + 2.5, with
higher scores indicating higher institutional quality. Source: World Bank.
The number of deals entered by all the partners of the international alliance in
five years before the focal deal. Source: manually computed, based on SDC
Platinum.
Average distance of all the participants from the location of the international
alliances. The distance of each participant consists in the air miles between the
the capital city of its home country and the capital city of the host country
(“great circle distance”, Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). Source: manually
computed.
It takes the value 1 when the international alliance has more than two
participants, and 0 otherwise. Source: manually computed, based on SDC
Platinum.
It takes the value 1 when at least one the participants in the international alliance
is a large player and at least one is not, and 0 otherwise. Source: a list of large
players manually compiled with the assistance of an industry expert (see Table
2).
It takes the value 1 when all the participants in the international alliances are
large players, and 0 otherwise. Source: a list of large players manually compiled
with the assistance of an industry expert (see Table 2).
Gross domestic product of the host country in trillions of US dollars. Source:
World Bank.
It takes the value 1 when the actitivies of the international alliance involve small
electrical appliances (microwave ovens, vacuum cleaners, and small kitchen
machines). Source: manually coded, based on SDC Platinum, press releases, and
company materials.
It takes the value 1 when the actitivies of the international alliance involve nonhousehold appliances, including commercial appliances (large size freezers,
washing machines and other appliances used in restaurants, hospitals,
communities, etc.), parts, and services. Source: manually coded, based on SDC
Platinum, press releases, and company materials.
It takes the value 1 when the actitivies of the international alliance involve large
electrical appliances (air conditioners, dishwashers, dryers, freezers and
refrigerators, and washing machines). Source: manually coded, based on SDC
Platinum, press releases, and company materials.
It takes the value 1 when the international alliance was announced after 1996
(the mid point of the series). Source: SDC Platinum.
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Table 4.
Descriptives and correlations.
Variable

Mean S.D.

Min

Max

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1 JV

0.77

0.42

0.00

1.00 1.00

2 EQUITY

0.79

0.41

0.00

1.00 0.92 1.00

3 OFFSHORE

0.63

0.48

0.00

1.00 -0.08 -0.06 1.00

4 MANUF.

0.83

0.38

0.00

1.00 0.33 0.35 0.29 1.00

5 MARKETING

0.40

0.49

0.00

1.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.35 -0.40 1.00

6 R&D

0.09

0.28

0.00

1.00 -0.34 -0.31 0.07 -0.11 0.02 1.00

7 WGIMEAN

0.08

0.73 -1.38

8 EXPERIENCE

3.15

4.15

0.00 28.00 -0.14 -0.17 0.19 -0.05 -0.06 0.21 0.05 1.00

9 DISTANCE

1.97

1.34

0.00

7.85 -0.14 -0.18 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 0.15 0.12 0.03 1.00

10 MULTILAT.

0.14

0.35

0.00

1.00 0.17 0.15 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 1.00

11 ALL_LARGE

0.15

0.36

0.00

1.00 -0.17 -0.18 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.29 0.17 0.33 0.04 0.05 1.00

12 LARGE_SM.

0.51

0.50

0.00

1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.21 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 0.23 -0.06 -0.03 -0.43 1.00

13 GDP

1.37

2.43

0.00 15.53 -0.20 -0.21 -0.03 -0.17 0.21 0.21 0.37 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 0.13 -0.19 1.00

14 SMALL_EL

0.20

0.41

0.00

1.00 -0.08 -0.05 0.01 -0.21 0.11 0.04 0.13 -0.16 0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 0.14 1.00

15 NON_HH

0.20

0.40

0.00

1.00 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.15 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.13 0.13 0.01 -0.09 1.00

16 LARGE_EL

0.60

0.49

0.00

1.00 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.22 -0.11 -0.05 -0.14 0.13 -0.12 0.08 0.19 0.13 -0.21 -0.62 -0.25 1.00

17 AFTER_1996

0.44

0.50

0.00

1.00 -0.28 -0.33 0.00 -0.18 0.06 0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 -0.11 0.22 0.11 0.05 -0.03

1.87 -0.33 -0.30 -0.03 -0.27 0.18 0.29 1.00

N = 261. Correlation coefficients larger than |.12| are significant at the p = .05 level (two-tailed).
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Table 5.
Logistic regression. Determinants of the governance mode.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

DV: JV

DV: JV

DV: JV

Coefficient

OR

Coefficient

OR

Coefficient

OR

8.818**
(6.502)
3.027+
(0.057)
0.140*
(0.119)
0.615
(0.259)
1.018
(0.074)
0.920
(0.145)
36.521*
(56.619)
0.567
(0.378)
0.181+
(0.173)
0.628*
(0.113)
0.651
(0.453)
1.307
(0.848)
1.747
(1.215)
Yes
Yes
4.015
(5.556)

-1.784**
(0.664)
2.951***
(0.845)
0.908
(0.687)
-1.731+
(0.904)
-0.458
(0.435)
0.054
(0.079)
-0.138
(0.172)
3.623*
(1.617)
-0.263
(0.699)
-1.602
(0.998)
-0.482*
(0.187)
0.030
(0.739)
0.449
(0.659)
0.781
(0.724)
Yes
Yes
1.721
(1.496)

0.168**
(0.112)
19.124***
(16.165)
2.480
(1.703)
0.177+
(0.160)
0.633
(0.275)
1.056
(0.083)
0.871
(0.150)
37.434*
(60.542)
0.769
(0.538)
0.201
(0.201)
0.617*
(0.115)
1.031
(0.761)
1.568
(1.034)
2.183
(1.580)
Yes
Yes
5.588
(8.362)

OFFSHORE
MANUFACTURING
MARKETING
R&D
WGIMEAN
EXPERIENCE
DISTANCE
MULTILATERAL
LARGE_SMALL
ALL_LARGE
GDP
SMALL_EL
NON_HH
LARGE_EL
Year effects
Location effects
Intercept

N
pseudo R2
Log likelihood

-0.037
(0.061)
-0.120
(0.148)
2.808*
(1.138)
-0.887
(0.613)
-1.691+
(0.865)
-0.377*
(0.175)
-0.725
(0.647)
-0.043
(0.575)
0.708
(0.638)
Yes
Yes
3.630**
(1.133)

0.964
(0.059)
0.887
(0.131)
16.572*
(18.856)
0.412
(0.252)
0.184+
(0.159)
0.686*
(0.120)
0.484
(0.313)
0.958
(0.551)
2.030
(1.295)
Yes
Yes
37.732**
(42.763)

261
0.370
-89.331

2.177**
(0.737)
1.107+
(0.640)
-1.965*
(0.851)
-0.486
(0.421)
0.017
(0.072)
-0.084
(0.157)
3.598*
(1.550)
-0.567
(0.666)
-1.709+
(0.955)
-0.465*
(0.181)
-0.429
(0.696)
0.268
(0.649)
0.558
(0.696)
Yes
Yes
1.390
(1.384)

261
0.434
-80.357

261
0.464
-76.092

Models report b values (coefficient) and odds ratios (OR). Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 6.
Logistic regression. Subsample analysis of determinants of the governance mode.
Model 4
Market-seeking
DV: JV

MANUFACTURING
MARKETING
R&D
WGIMEAN
EXPERIENCE
DISTANCE
MULTILATERAL
LARGE_SMALL
ALL_LARGE
GDP
SMALL_EL
NON_HH
LARGE_EL
AFTER_1996
Location effects
Intercept

N
Pseudo R2
Log likelihood

Model 5
Offshoring
DV: JV

Coefficient

OR

Coefficient

OR

3.177*
(1.348)
1.738
(1.406)
-1.703
(2.494)
-0.676
(0.880)
-0.029
(0.172)
-0.472
(0.288)
6.177+
(3.280)
-5.170**
(1.947)
-2.807
(1.915)
0.041
(0.267)
2.909*
(1.442)
3.564+
(1.905)
4.173*
(1.976)
-3.064*
(1.429)
Yes
0.810
(2.203)

23.968*
(32.314)
5.687
(7.996)
0.182
(0.454)
0.509
(0.448)
0.971
(0.167)
0.623
(0.180)
481.634+
(1579.504)
0.006**
(0.011)
0.060
(0.116)
1.042
(0.278)
18.337*
(26.438)
35.298+
(67.252)
64.897*
(128.259)
0.047*
(0.067)
Yes
2.247
(4.950)

3.015**
(0.967)
0.583
(0.626)
-1.536+
(0.837)
-1.155**
(0.449)
-0.023
(0.077)
0.258
(0.209)
4.552+
(2.758)
0.802
(0.691)
-1.373
(0.900)
-0.095
(0.149)
0.026
(0.811)
-0.251
(0.637)
-0.084
(0.755)
-1.629**
(0.568)
Yes
-1.222
(1.459)

20.388**
(19.725)
1.792
(1.122)
0.215+
(0.180)
0.315**
(0.142)
0.977
(0.075)
1.295
(0.270)
94.873+
(261.670)
2.231
(1.540)
0.253
(0.228)
0.909
(0.136)
1.026
(0.833)
0.778
(0.496)
0.920
(0.694)
0.196
(0.111)
Yes
0.295
(0.430)

96
0.549
-20.873

161
0.395
-57.279

Models report b values (coefficient) and odds ratios (OR). Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 7.
Robustness checks and post-estimation analyses.
Model 6
DV: Equity

OFFSHORE
MANUFACTURING
MARKETING
R&D
WGIMEAN
EXPERIENCE
DISTANCE
MULTILATERAL
LARGE_SMALL
ALL_LARGE
GDP
SMALL_EL
NON_HH
LARGE_EL

Model 3
DV: JV

Model 7
Market-seeking
DV: Equity

Model 8
Offshoring
DV: Equity

Coefficient

Coefficient

4.352+
(2.374)
4.725+
(2.677)
1.790
(3.223)
-1.705
(1.895)
-0.057
(0.201)
1.529+
(0.923)
14.112
(15.736)
-19.136
(51.147)
-16.697
(51.047)
-0.615
(0.698)
8.615*
(4.360)
12.745
(50.576)
16.276
(50.823)
-10.388+
(5.689)
No
Yes
7.107
(5.988)

3.474**
(1.060)
0.629
(0.733)
-0.735
(0.892)
-1.549**
(0.586)
-0.087
(0.092)
0.169
(0.227)
5.913
(4.010)
0.921
(0.816)
-1.782+
(1.080)
-0.002
(0.162)
0.362
(0.879)
-0.726
(0.691)
0.036
(0.829)
-2.830***
(0.734)
No
Yes
0.085
(1.638)

96
0.746
-11.367

165
0.417
-46.422

Coefficient

OR

ME

ME

-1.551*
(0.699)
3.036**
(0.908)
1.084
(0.794)
-1.452
(1.019)
-0.395
(0.520)
0.027
(0.084)
-0.285
(0.194)
4.141+
(2.193)
-0.739
(0.810)
-1.946+
(1.106)
-0.425*
(0.187)
0.671
(0.802)
0.004
(0.672)
1.350+
(0.784)

0.212*
(0.148)
20.813**
(18.897)
2.958
(2.347)
0.234
(0.239)
0.674
(0.350)
1.027
(0.087)
0.752
(0.146)
62.866+
(137.854)
0.478
(0.387)
0.143+
(0.158)
0.653*
(0.122)
1.956
(1.570)
1.004
(0.675)
3.856+
(3.024)

-0.108**
(0.042)
0.307**
(0.095)
0.077
(0.050)
-0.133
(0.104)
-0.031
(0.040)
0.002
(0.007)
-0.022
(0.015)
0.183***
(0.042)
-0.058
(0.063)
-0.179
(0.112)
-0.033*
(0.014)
0.049
(0.056)
0.000
(0.052)
0.106+
(0.060)

-0.144**
(0.044)
0.343***
(0.097)
0.077
(0.053)
-0.195+
(0.114)
-0.041
(0.039)
0.005
(0.007)
-0.012
(0.015)
0.203***
(0.043)
-0.024
(0.063)
-0.170
(0.116)
-0.044**
(0.016)
0.003
(0.066)
0.039
(0.054)
0.072
(0.0068)

Yes
Yes
1.962
(1.670)

Yes
Yes
7.111
(11.872)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

AFTER_1996
Year effects
Location effects
Intercept

N
pseudo R2
Log likelihood

261
0.508
-65.511

Models report b values (coefficient), odds ratios (OR) and marginal effects (ME) calculated as averages of marginal
effects at each observation. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Figure 1.
Distribution of the deals across years. N = 261.
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Figure 2.
Interaction effects: Probability of the joint venture mode.
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